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ABSTRACT 
This research paper examines the role of judicial review in the New 
Zealand fishing industry, and in particular whether it is successful in acting as 
a judicial balance upon regulation in this segment of the commercial arena. The 
effect of judicial review on five separate aspects of the industry is considered , 
with the areas being the quota management system, the challenge to principal 
legislation, the challenge to subordinate legislation , the forfeiture regimes, and 
Maori commercial fishing interests. The differences between the exercises of 
administrative power challenged in each of these areas are such that judicial 
review has played several disparate roles . It is concluded that judicial review 
has acted as an effective mechanism for defining rights and obligations, 
informing administrative decision making , and bringing problems in the 
legislation to the attention of Parliament. In these varied roles , the impact of 
judicial review upon the New Zealand fishing industry has been a positive one. 
WORD LENGTH 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes , bibliography, and 
annexures) comprises approximately 13200 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 
New Zealand's fisheries are one of its most important natural resources. 
Around 100 commercially significant species are spread throughout an 
exclusive economic zone covering 15 times the area of New Zealand's land 
mass. From the Hauraki Gulf to the remote Chatham Islands, hundreds of 
thousands of tonnes of fish are caught annually. 1 The fishing industry provides 
a major export earner for New Zealand's economy, and provides a livelihood for 
thousands, from small family owned operations to corporate giants. The 
industry has been strictly regulated by the legislature from the outset, with 
Fisheries Acts being passed in 1908, 1983, and 1996, along with important 
amendment Acts in 1986 and 1992. This legislation is notable for its complexity, 
with the most recent Fisheries Act running to over 400 pages. This complexity 
is added to by the masses of Regulations that govern specific aspects of 
commercial fishing in New Zealand . 
Where industry and regulation collide, legal issues invariably arise. The 
fishing industry is no exception to this. This paper considers the role of judicial 
review in responding to these issues, and whether its availability has had any 
wider impact upon the actions of administrators and other stakeholders within 
the industry. As noted , the industry is extremely heavily regulated, and the 
consideration of the role of judicial review will of necessity be broken down into 
different areas. These areas are as follows: 
1. The Quota Management System 
2. The Challenge to Principal Legislation 
3. The Challenge to Subordinate Legislation 
4. Other Administrative Powers: The Forfeiture Regimes 
5. Maori and the New Zealand Fishing Industry 
1 Total allowable commercial catch was 598 244 tonnes in 1994, and 475 596 tonnes in 1995. 
See New Zealand Official Yearbook 1996 (99 ed, Statistics New Zealand, Wellington, 1996) 403-
405 . 
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The role of judicial review will be considered individually in each of these areas. 
The legislative background and relevant decided cases will be discussed, 
before concluding at the end of each section upon the effects of judicial review 
in that particular area. This paper is based upon the provisions of the Fisheries 
Act 1983. Where appropriate, each section will contain comment on the 
potential effect of the Fisheries Act 1996, which is yet to come into force, and 
will do so on dates set by Order in Council. A final section will attempt to draw 
the strands together and conclude as to the effects of judicial review on the 
industry as a whole. 
J 
In 1949 Lord Denning anticipated the need for judicial review, calling for 
the replacement of the prerogative remedies with "new and up to date 
machinery." As picks and shovels were no longer suitable for the winning of 
coal, neither were the procedures of mandamus, certiorari, or actions on the 
case suitable for the "winning of freedom in the new age."2 In 1987 Woolf L J 
(as he then was) agreed with Lord Denning's earlier assessment of the need for 
change, but argued that the procedure of judicial review developed by the 
courts in the latter half of this century had modernised these prerogative 
remedies so as to provide the "new machinery" called for. 3 In concluding his 
lecture, Woolf L J stated :4 
Lord Denning referred to the need for new machinery in 1949, but certiorari and the 
other prerogative remedies have proved to be not picks and shovels but, as they were 
described by the present Master of the Rolls in the course of a recent lecture on 
judicial review, a "non-nuclear deterrent" well capable of meeting the challenge set by 
Lord Denning of protecting our freedom in the new age. It must not be forgotten that 
for every case in which the court intervenes there are many more where it does not 
have to because of this non-nuclear deterrent. Judicial review is doing and will do its 
job in the commercial arena well. 
2 Rt Hon Lord Denning, Inaugural Hamlyn Lecture "1949- Freedom Under the Law", quoted 
in Woolf "Judicial Review in the Commercial Arena" (The Bar Association for Commerce, 
Finance, and Industry, The Denning Lecture 1987) 1. 
3 Woolf, above n 2, 2. 
4 Woolf, above n 2, 12. 
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The role of judicial review in the New Zealand fishing industry will be considered 
in the light of these comments. In particular, the efficacy of judicial review in 
protecting or defining the rights of those aggrieved by administrative decisions 
in specific areas of the industry will be examined. The wider effects of judicial 
review will also be discussed, including the legislative reaction to successful 
judicial review applications, and the effect of the availability of judicial review 
upon administrative decision making. 
II THE QUOTA MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
The New Zealand fishing industry is largely regulated by the Quota 
Management System (QMS). This system was introduced by the Fisheries 
Amendment Act 1986, a piece of legislation described at the time to be "as 
important to fisheries as the land title system is to land ."
5 Under the OMS 
persons are allocated provisional maximum individual transferable quotas 
(PMITQ) on the basis of their commercial fishing history, with the possibility of 
adjustment on certain grounds of unfairness.
6 The size of the quota allocated 
or the non-allocation of quota can be the subject of appeal to the Quota Appeal 
Authority (QAA) , at the suit of either the person affected by the determination 
or the Director-General of Fisheries. The QAA is established bys 28A Fisheries 
Act 1983, and consists of three members: the Chairperson, being a barrister 
and solicitor of not less than 7 years' standing, a member appointed by 
consultation with the Fishing Industry Board, and another member who shall not 
be an employee of the Ministry.
7 It has the sole function of hearing appeals and 
making decisions under ss 28H, 28HA, and 281 of the Act. The QAA is obliged 
to inform the parties concerned in each case of its decision and, importantly, of 
5 Hon D Kidd, MP (1986) 471 NZPD 2379. 
6 The criteria for the allocation of PMITQ and grounds for adjustment are considered in detail 
below. 
7 This was a departure from the original flawed idea of having the Director-General both as 
a party to all proceedings in the QAA and as appointing one of the members. 
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the reasons for its decision. 8 Such decisions are not appealable, and are final 
unless challenged by application for review under Part I of the Judicature 
Amendment Act 1972.9 
A The Role of Judicial Review 
1 The significance of an exclusive right of review 
As noted above, decisions of the QAA are not appealable and the only 
way in which they can be questioned in Court is by review. The exclusive right 
of judicial review from a determination of the QAA, as expressed in s 281(3) 
appears to be unique in New Zealand law. Other statutory appeal authorities 
and review authorities purport to make final decisions, or allow for a general or 
specific right of appeal to the High Court. 10 British enactments commonly 
contain a right of "statutory review", but this is conceptually different and 
narrower than full judicial review. 11 Statutory review provisions generally relate 
to areas such as town planning or compulsory acquisition of land where the 
certainty of a determination is of great importance. They are strictly limited in 
time and an order quashing the decision reviewed is the only remedy 
available.12 Following the implementation of the QMS, with the initial allocations 
of PMITQ and decisions of the QAA, a large number of decisions were 
challenged by review in the High Court. Due to perceived negative effects on 
the fishing industry, legislation was passed reducing the scope of such reviews 
8 Section 281(2). 
9 Section 281(3). This section acts as a partial ouster clause, a type which is enforced without 
judicial resistance. See H WR Wade, Administrative Law (7 ed, Clarendon, Oxford, 1994) 741. 
10 See Legislation Advisory Committee Report No. 3: Administrative Tribunals (Department 
of Justice, Wellington, 1989) Appendix 3 for modes of appeal from such tribunals. 
11 Law Commission Report No 226 Administrative Law: Judicial Review and Statutory 
Appeals (HMSO, London, 1993) paras 12.12, 12.13. 
12 Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 126 Administrative Law: Judicial Review and 
Statutory Appeals (HMSO, London, 1992) Annex 2 for a full list of provisions. 
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and limiting the time available for their initiation .
13 This has brought the 
procedure for judicial review of QAA decisions more
 into line with the policy 
behind the English system of statutory review. 
2 Reasons for judicial review rather than appeal 
Whether the QAA should be subject to review or 
appeal was not 
debated in Parliament, and was undoubtedly dealt wi
th at select committee.
14 
Review may have been seen as more appropriate due 
to the narrow originating 
grounds under which quota may be allocated , and the
 desirability of certainty 
in allocation . The QAA determines an appeal from th
e Director-General by a 
hearing de novo, which may be challenged on any 
of the usual grounds of 
review. As stated by the Court of Appeal in the lea
ding case of Jenssen v 
Director-General of Agriculture and Fisheries: 
15 
.. . the legislature has stopped short of giving an appe
al to the Courts, so ensuring a 
considerable measure of conclusiveness to the Appea
l Authority's decisions. As every 
lawyer knows but is not always understood by non
-lawyers, this is narrower than 
appeal. Broadly it is review to ensure that the Authority 
acts in accordance with law and 
principle, in accordance with natural justice as far as p
rocedure is concerned , and on 
an assessment of the facts that is open to a reasonab
le Authority. 
In practice, at least until the 1992 amendment, QAA de
cisions failed to 
provide any real conclusiveness . The legislative decis
ion to provide a right of 
review rather than a right of appeal did not inhibit fu
rther litigation; it merely 
changed the form of the pleadings. 
B The Legislation 
13 Fisheries Amendment Act (No 3) 1992. See below,
 Part Ill. 
14 At the first reading of the I 986 Bill Hon M Mc Tigue
 MP raised the question of whether the 
QAA would be subject to appeal: (1985) 468 NZPD 
8969. Select committee discussion was not 
reported. 
15 Jenssen v Director-General of Agriculture and Fishe
ries Unreported, 19 September 1992, 
Court of Appeal, CA 313/91, 2-3. 
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At this stage the quota allocation procedure originally introduced by the 
Fisheries Amendment Act 1986, and the litigation resulting therefrom, is 
considered. The original system allowed the greatest scope for the exercise of 
administrative discretion, which culminated in a substantial number of 
applications for review. As will be seen below, the Act was further amended in 
1992, which led to a more restricted role for judicial review in this area. 
The original criteria enabling the Director-General to grant PMITQ are 
contained within s 28E, the first three subsections of which are set out below: 
(28E. Criteria for granting provisional maximum individual transferable quotas--(1) 
Where any declaration is made under section 288 of this Act, the Director-General shall make 
an allocation of provisional maximum individual transferable quotas in accordance with this 
section , using as a base the proportion that the commercial catch of the person in that quota 
management area of that species of class of fish as shown in the fishing returns of that person 
bears to the total commercial catch in that quota management area of that species or class of 
fish in previous years. 
(2) Allocations may be made under subsection (1) of this section only to --
(a) Persons who are holders of fishing permits issued under this Act at the date of the 
declaration under section 288 of this Act; and 
(b) Persons who have held such permits within the previous 12 months or such longer period 
as the Director-General considers appropriate for special reasons relating to any particular case. 
(3) In determining any provisional maximum individual transferable quota the Director-General 
may, where the Director-General is satisfied in a particular case that the provisional maximum 
individual quota determined under subsection (1) of this section would be unfair having regard 
to--
(a) The commitment to, and dependence on , the taking of fish of that species or class in that 
quota management area by the person at that date of the declaration under section 288 of this 
Act, and 
(b) The other provisional maximum individual transferable quota (if any) allocated to that 
person, --
allocate a different provisional maximum individual transferable quota to the person . 
This section has provided the basis for most of the applications for 
review of QAA decisions considered in this paper. It contains mandatory 
considerations (the applicant's formal fishing history) followed by a discretion to 
vary any allocation on the grounds of unfairness. The criteria set out in s 28E 
are equally applicable to decisions of the QAA as to determinations of the 
l O Judicial Review and the New Zealand Fishing Industry 
Director-General. 16 The efforts of the courts to deal by way of judicial review 
with decisions made under this section are considered below. 
C Judicial Review of PMITQ Allocations 
1 Determinations under section 28E 
Where an applicant for a PMITQ had an uninterrupted and unhindered 
fishing history in the relevant QMA during the years prior to it becoming subject 
to the QMS, the allocation may be made with relative ease by applying s 28E(1) 
to the applicant's individual circumstances. However, the infinite vagaries of 
fishing and weather conditions, equipment problems, and personal 
circumstances meant that in a large number of cases, an applicant would not 
be satisfied with quota allocations arising from such a mechanical process. In 
recognition of this the Director-General retained a twofold discretion: to allocate 
PMITQ to past holders of fishing permits, and to allocate a different quota if a 
determination under s 28E(1) would be "unfair". 
Review of the exercise of this discretion does not require consideration 
of the usual preliminary issue of whether Parliament intended to empower the 
administrator or tribunal to make a conclusive determination .17 Parliament 
undoubtedly contemplated such decisions being subject to review by providing 
an express right of review pursuant to s 281. The issues relate to the actual 
exercise of the discretions contained in the section by the QAA. 
The questions that have come before the Courts most frequently relate 
to the QAA's application of s 28E(3), which enables a different quota to be 
allocated on grounds of unfairness, having regard to the applicant's 
"commitment to, and dependence on" the taking of fish of a particular class. 
16 Any reference to the exercise of a discretion in this section of the paper could equally apply 
to the Director-General or the QAA. 
17 Eg Hm1 1kins v Minister of Justice [l 991] 2 NZLR 530, 534, 536; Bulk Gas Users Group v 
Attorney-General [ l 983] NZLR 129, 133-135. 
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The most authoritative interpretation of these terms is that of the Court of 
Appeal in Jenssen, where it was stated: 18 
The words chosen by the legislature are obviously deliberately wide. We think that the 
true interpretation is that ·commitment' extends to a firm intention to fish for a species, 
evinced by the taking of significant practical steps to that end ; and that dependence 
refers to the economic significance of the species in the person's fishing history or 
plans. 
In that case, it was held that the QAA had not focused adequately on whether 
expenditure of more than $50 OOO outfitting the applicant's vessel with deep 
water winches would have been incurred but for a firm intention to fish for 
orange roughy.19 At first instance McGechan J had held that the phrase "having 
regard to" in s 28E(3) meant "having regard only to ."20 However, this was not 
followed in the Court of Appeal judgment and was expressly rejected by 
Robertson J in Ruocco v QAA.21 In the earlier case of McLean & Wylie v 
Director-General of Agriculture and Fisheries Heron J stated that "In my view 
[s 28E(3)(a)] places only a modest fetter on the general discretion open to the 
Appeal Authority to cure injustice by allocating different quota."22 It is clear that 
the question of whether an allocation is unfair is to be given a wide 
consideration . 
2 Grounds of review 
18 Above n 15, l 0. 
19 Above n 15, 8-9. 
20 Jenssen v Director-General of Agriculture and Fisheries Unreported, 14 October 1991, 
High Court, Wellington Registry, CP 1035/90, 25. 
21 Ruocco v QAA Unreported, 1 March 1996, High Court, Wellington Registry, CP 1094/90, 
8. In this respect Ellis J took the wrong approach in Robinson v QAA Unreported, 18 May 1993, 
High Court, Napier Registry, M 116/9 1, 14. 
22 McLean & Wylie v Director-General of Agriculture and Fisheries Unreported, 18 March 
1992, High Court, Wellington Registry, CP 892/90, 16. 
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The background circumstances of cases such as those that have led 
to review proceedings in the High Court are complex. The Director-General's 
and then the QAA's discretion is exercised after reference to the applicant's 
fishing history, along with various other related factors relied on by the 
applicant, or by counsel before the QAA, as establishing unfairness. However, 
the courts have preferred not to place weight upon previous determinations 
made under s 28E(3), apart from on the interpretation of the section in Jenssen. 
As Robertson J stated in Ruocco: 23 
Arguments which were advanced on the basis of the treatment of other individuals 
appear to me to have little substance. The statutory framework envisaged an 
individualised but consistent approach .... [T]he purpose of [s] 28E(3) was to ensure 
individual justice in individual cases. So long as there is proper attention to all relevant 
factors under that section, endeavouring to draw analogy from other cases is less than 
productive. 
It has been emphasised by the courts that the exercise they are 
conducting is review and that the merits of a case are not to be considered.
24 
The cases decided thus far have not concerned the challenge of decisions on 
procedural grounds; they have all been based on what Taylor refers to as errors 
in the deliberative process. 25 Decisions of the QAA have been held bad due to 
their misinterpretation of the section or their failure to correctly apply it to the 
facts as proved . The Courts have not appeared overly concerned with 
"compartmentalising" the grounds of review once the broad failings of the QAA 
have been made out. The expressed grounds of review have often been in 
combination, usually combining error of law with failure to take account of 
23 Above n 21, 14. 
24 See Jenssen, above n 15, 2-3; Ruocco, above n 21, 7, 11 ; (particularly) Pohio v Director-
General of Agriculture and Fisheries Unreported, 1 September 1993, High Court, Wellington 
Registry, CP 463/90, 2. 
25 G D S Taylor Judicial Review: A New Zealand Perspective (Butterworths, Wellington, 
1991) para 11.2. 
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relevant considerations or taking account of irrelevancies. 26 This holistic type of 
approach is encapsulated in the statement of the Court of Appeal in Jenssen, 
where it was said that "the grounds of failure to take into account an essential 
consideration and error of approach or unreasonableness overlap, as is often 
the case in administrative law."27 
It is noteworthy that the courts have not been tempted to review the 
unfairness-based discretion in s 28E with reference to substantive unfairness 
in the administrative law sense, despite the requests of counsel. 28 In this context 
any "unfairness" is unrelated to legitimate expectation . It would only add to the 
existing grounds of review if Cooke P's formulation in Thames Valley Electric 
Power Board is followed : that substantive unfairness "is a legitimate ground of 
judicial review, shading into but not identical with unreasonableness. "29 As yet 
the Courts have had little difficulty in reviewing QAA decisions within more 
established grounds, even if these have not always been defined with precision. 
It is submitted that, at least in this particular area, reliance upon substantive 
unfairness should be avoided . Reviewing a discretion based on statutory 
unfairness with reference to the substantive unfairness of that decision would 
26 Eg Robinson, above n 21, taking account of irrelevancies; Ruocco, above n 21, error of 
law/unreasonableness; Pohio, above n 24, error of law; Mclean & Wylie, above n 22, error of 
law/failure to take account of relevant considerations; Montgomery v Attorney-General 
Unreported, 28 March 1988, High Court, Auckland Registry, CP 1445/86, 
unreasonableness/fai lure to take account of relevant considerations; Austro Seafoods (Fishing) 
Ltd v QAA Unreported, 3 May 1993, High Court, Wellington Registry, CP 1007/89, error of 
law/taking account of irrelevancies. 
27 Above n 15, 10. The decisions in Jenssen and Pohio, above n 24, have been seen as 
applications of an unreasonableness concept wider than the traditional Wednesbury standard. See 
J Caldwell "Judicial Review: Review of the Merits?" [1995] NZLJ 343, 345. 
28 For example Ruocco, above n 21, 14. The discussion of substantive unfairness by McGechan 
J in Destounis v Minister of Fisheries Unreported, 11 February 1993, High Court, Wellington 
Registry, CP I /87 has been largely eclipsed by later developments. 
29 Thames Valley Electric Power Board v NZFP Pulp and Paper Ltd [1994] 2 NZLR 641, 652. 
See M Poole "Legitimate Expectation and Substantive Fairness: Beyond the Limits of Procedural 
Propriety" [1995] NZ Law Review 426. 
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blur the boundaries of judicial review, in these circumstances, to a hopeless 
extent. As stated recently by Fisher J :30 
Litigants constantly try to persuade the Courts to revisit the merits of a dispute under 
the guise of judicial review .... The High Court is not an administrative appeal tribunal. 
I might add that the recognition of substantive unfairness as an untrammelled ground 
for review would only feed that misconception. 
3 Is review appropriate? 
There is no problem in theory with a Court conducting a review of a 
statutory discretion based on unfairness. In particular, the Court does not have 
to determine whether or not there was actually "unfairness", in coming to its 
decision. Relevarrt considerations upon which the discretion can be exercised 
may be ascertained partly through the express terms of the section, partly 
through implication , and partly through legislative context.31 Issues of irrationality 
and error of law can be determined in the normal manner. As noted earlier, the 
rationale for the discretion in s 28E to extend a PMITQ was to ensure the 
provision of individual justice.32 PMITQ allocations are vital to the economic 
viability of every fisher's operation . Nevertheless, the QAA has consistently 
taken over 2 years to decide appeals from determinations of the Director-
General.33 As stated in Jenssen: 34 
The delay reflects a system of hearing all or a large number of appeals before deciding 
any. It was a system possibly better calculated to produce fairly uniform results than 
to do justice in the particular circumstances of individual cases. 
30 Waitakere City Council v Waitemata Electricity Shareholders Society Inc Unreported, 18 
March 1996, High Court, Auckland Registry, M 1524/95 , 15. 
31 CREEDNZ Inc v Governor-General [1981] l NZLR 172, 183; Hawkins v Minister of 
Justice , above n 17, 536. 
32 See text accompanying note 23 . 
33 Eg in Ruocco, above n 21 ; Jenssen, above n 15; Austro Seafoods, above n 26. 
34Above n 15, 6. 
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This does not accord with the focus on individual fairness and, as discussed 
below, is not a problem created by the use of the judicial review jurisdiction; nor 
could the use of judicial review redress it. The problems were inherent within the 
administrative system created to regulate the QMS. 
D The QMS and the Fisheries Act 1996 
The QMS has been retained under the new Act but with notable 
alterations. Quota are allocated on the basis of an individual's provisional catch 
history, which is assessed in accordance with previous individual catch 
entitlements or the fisher's eligible catch from the previous year, depending 
upon the type of fishery. 35 Each fishery stock is divided into 100 OOO OOO 
shares, and an individual is allocated shares, the quota weight equivalent to that 
person's provisional catch history. 36 The QAA will be abolished and replaced 
with the Catch History Review Committee (CHRC), which is entitled to hear 
appeals relating to both catch history and quota allocations. 37 Any person 
refused quota by the Chief Executive on the grounds that they were an 
"overseas person" can apply directly to the High Court for a declaration as to 
whether this is correct. 38 The CHRC is established bys 283, and is made up of 
barristers and solicitors of at least 7 years standing who are not employees of 
the Ministry. Similarly to the QAA, the CHRC has broad powers to regulate its 
own procedure, and must provide written decisions stating reasons. Equally, its 
decisions are to be final unless challenged by application for review under Part 
I Judicature Amendment Act 1972.39 Any application in respect of a "decision 
or purported decision" of the CHRC must be made within 3 months of that 
35 Sections 29-41. 
36 Section 47(1). 
37 Section 51. 
38 Section 51 (2)( a). 
39 Section 293(4). 
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decision.40 The grounds of "commitment and dependence" as a basis f
or quota 
allocation are not repeated in the new Act, removing the most difficult p
rovision 
dealt with by the QAA. Due to the wholly mechanical nature of the a
llocation 
process under the new legislation, decisions of the CHRC under s 51 a
re more 
likely to involve matters of fact or quantum, rather than matters of law. W
ith less 
contentious issues arising before the Review Committee, it is probable
 that the 
role of judicial review in this area will be reduced correspondingly. 
E Conclusion 
The amount of litigation concerning quota allocations is an indication of
 
the sorry state of this area of the law. The problems are deep sea
ted: the 
allocation mechanism itself, with an inflexible history-based allocatio
n being 
supplemented with the amorphous concept of "commitment and depen
dence", 
and the length of delay before the issue of QAA decisions. While ensu
ring that 
these decisions are made in accordance with administrative law pr
inciples, 
judicial review has not succeeded in bringing order to this area of the 
industry, 
except indirectly: the legislature were so concerned with the effect 
that the 
decision in Jenssen would have on the industry that it amended the F
isheries 
Act to require a fishing permit to be held before quota could be allo
cated. 41 
Judicial review cannot be seen as acting as a "non-nuclear deterrent" w
ithin this 
area of the industry: applications for review were rife and continuous 
until the 
change in the substantive grounds for quota allocation. The amendme
nts also 
served to reduce the role that the QAA would play in QMS regulation.
 As well 
as providing a substantive reduction in the grounds of quota allocati
on, they 
increased administrative efficiency by minimising the scope for hearing
s before 
the QAA. This removal of the main discretionary basis for the decision
 has led 
to a corresponding decline in applications for review. The spectre of re
view did 
not lead to any ascertainable improvement in QAA decisions, and the
 limited 
scope of review as opposed to a more general appeal did not deter ag
grieved 
40 Section 293(5). 
41 See below, Part III. 
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parties seeking to improve their allocations. This may be seen as more of a 
reflection on the economic matters at stake and the regulating legislation than 
as any failing within the judicial review jurisdiction. 
Ill THE CHALLENGE TO PRINCIPAL LEGISLATION 
A Cooper & Others v Attorney-General 
Judicial review has been used on a number of occasions to challenge 
perceived abuses of executive power which have impacted upon the fishing 
industry. This has included challenges to the validity of regulations made under 
the Act, and even a challenge to amending legislation itself. Cooper & Others 
v Attomey-Generaf2 was a test case representing 18 claims of fishers whose 
ability to seek judicial review of QAA decisions was effectively removed by the 
Fisheries Amendment Act (No 3) 1992.43 Section 28ZGA(1) Fisheries Act 1983, 
as inserted by the amending Act, provides: 
28ZGA. Limitations on powers of Quota Appeal Authority and courts in certain cases ---
(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Act or any other enactment or rule of law, in respect 
of any proceedings concerning any species of fish subject to a quota management system at the 
commencement of this section,--
(a) Neither the Quota Appeal Authority nor any court shall , in respect of any proceedings 
whatever filed on or after the 16th day of September 1992, have power-
(!) To allocate to any person any provisional maximum individual transferable quota, 
guaranteed minimum individual transferable quota, or individual transferable quota for any 
species of fish in any quota management area; or 
(ii) To make a declaration or decision concerning the right of any person to such an 
allocation, -
unless that person was, immediately before the date of the relevant declaration under section 
288 of this Act, lawfully entitled, through the holding of a fishing permit and all other necessary 
authorities at that date, to take fish of that species in that area: 
42 Cooper & Others v Allorney-General Unreported, 7 May 1996, High Court, Auckland 
Registry, CP 1400/92. 
43 The amendment Act received the royal assent on 18 December 1992. 
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(b) No court or tribunal shall, in respect of any proceedings whatever filed on or after the 
16th day of September 1992, review, quash, or call into question-
(!) Any decision of the Director-General made before that date under section 28E(3) 
of this Act; or 
(ii) Any decision of the Quota Appeal Authority made under or in respect of section 281 
of this Act insofar as the decision relates to any decision of the Director-General under section 
28E(3) of this Act: 
This restriction applied to any proceedings filed on or after 16 September 1992, 
the date of the Court of Appeal judgment in Jenssen. 44 Indeed, the intention 
expressed in Parliament was that the amendment was designed to "ameliorate 
the impact"45 of the decisions in Gunn46 and Jenssen. Quota could no longer be 
allocated on the grounds of "commitment and dependence" alone, as was 
contemplated by the Court of Appeal in Jenssen; an existing fishing permit 
would be necessary before such matters could be given consideration. 
The Crown conceded that Mr Cooper's case was indistinguishable in 
principle from that in Jenssen.47 However, his application for review of the 
QAA's decision was destined to fail unless s 28ZGA(1) was not given effect. 
Counsel contended that the amending Act had purported to deprive their clients 
of access to the Court to secure a declaration concerning claimed substantive 
rights, infringing a fundamental constitutional principle.48 They relied upon dicta 
and academic writing of Lord Cooke of Thorndon49 in support of this contention, 
particularly his statement in New Zealand Road Carriers that: 50 
44 Above n 15. 
45 Hon Paul East, Attorney-General, (1992) 531 NZPD 12534. 
46 Gunn v Quota Appeal Authority [1993] NZAR 102. 
47 Above n 42, 29. 
48 Above n 42, 3. 
49 Particularly New Zealand Drivers Association v New Zealand Road Carriers [1982] 1 
NZLR 374, 390; Taylor v New Zealand Poultry Board [1984] 1 NZLR 394, 398; Sir R Cooke 
"Fundamentals" [1988] NZLJ 158. 
50 Above n 49, 390. 
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... we have reservations as to the extent to which in New Zealand even an Act of 
Parliament can take away the rights of citizens to resort to the ordinary courts of law 
for the determination of their rights. 
The amending legislation is drafted in a clumsy fashion , and on a literal reading 
could provide support for the plaintiffs' contention, that it deprived them of 
access to the courts . Baragwanath J drew a distinction between the apparent 
and the actual meaning of the section. His reasoning was heavily reliant on 
Parliament's intention as evinced in the Hansard reports quoted extensively 
within the judgment. As a matter of construction , Baragwanath J held that" ... 
the true purpose and effect of [the] amending legislation was not to deprive the 
parties of access to the Court to secure enforcement of legal rights, but rather 
to remove the rights themselves."51 There was no means to challenge such an 
action judicially under New Zealand law. This reasoning appears sound in 
respect of s 28ZGA(1 )(a) , which in substance changes the criteria for the 
allocation of quota, but not in respect of s 28ZGA(1 )(b) , which is a full ouster 
clause . The two paragraphs overlap in effect, and on a literal reading either 
could have been used to dispose of the applicant's claims. Baragwanath J did 
not distinguish between the different paragraphs of s 28ZGA(1) in allowing the 
strike-out application, but should be taken to have relied on s 28ZGA(1 )(a) . As 
discussed below, different considerations are applicable with regard to the 
ouster clause. 
Regardless of the construction issue, the likelihood of the court 
accepting the argument of the plaintiffs and granting the relief sought, a 
declaration that the amending legislation was of no effect, was minimal. As 
recently stated by Forsyth , a judge striking down legislation by reference to its 
merits was repugnant to the principle of parliamentary sovereignty and "would 
cast the judiciary into a maelstrom from which it would not emerge unscathed."52 
As to the amending Act's retrospective effect, Baragwanath J held that very 
51 Above n 42, 4. 
52 C Forsyth "Of Fig Leaves and Fairy-Tales: The Ultra Vires Doctrine, the Sovereignty of 
Parli ament, and Judicial Review" (1 996) 55 CLJ 122, 139. 
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clear construction would be required for an Act to be given such effect, but that 
in the present case such a conclusion was inescapable. 53 Section 28ZGA was 
given effect to its full tenor, which resulted in the claims of the applicants being 
struck out. 
The amending legislation also added s 281(4) to the original Act, a time-
limited ouster clause which requires applications for review of QAA decisions 
to be issued within 3 months of the parties notification of the QAA decision . Of 
more concern is s 28ZGA(1 )(b), the full ouster clause set out above and 
repeated here for ease of reference: 
(b) No court or tribunal shall , in respect of any proceedings whatever filed on or after the 
16th day of September 1992, review, quash , or call into question-
(!) Any decision of the Director-General made before that date under section 28E(3) 
of this Act; or 
(ii) Any decision of the Quota Appeal Authority made under or in respect of section 281 
of this Act insofar as the decision relates to any decision of the Director-General under section 
28E(3) of this Act: 
The original form of the amending clause was:
54 
(b) No court shall , in respect of any proceedings filed on or after the 16th day of September 
1992, review, quash , or call into question any decision of the Director-General made before or 
on or after that date under section 28E of this Act 
This provision was examined in Parliament by the Attorney-General, 
who considered it to be a prima facie breach of s 27(2) New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990. He recommended that it be amended so as not to preclude 
review of decisions made after the judgment in Jenssen, in order to justify it as 
a reasonable limitation pursuant to s 5 of that Act. 55 The amendment as 
53 Relying on L'Q//ice Cher(len Des Phosphates & Another v Yamashita Shinnion Steamship 
Co Ltd 119941 I AC 486, 524. 
54 Finance Bill (No. 6) 1992, amendments contained in Supplementary Order Paper No. 165, 
19 November 1992. 
~5 I Ion Paul East, Attorney-General , ( 1992) 531 NZPD 12534-12535. 
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eventually passed was substituted following a brief select committee hearing 
which was roundly criticised for its procedure by members of the House.56 It was 
not further discussed in the Parliament, and was passed in its current form on 
8 December 1992. In his judgment in Cooper Baragwanath J noted that "[t]he 
[B]ill was amended as the Attorney proposed ."57 Whether the amendment 
actually addressed the problem with which the Attorney-General was concerned 
is questionable. Subsection (1 )(b)(ii) is not limited in time; it purports to remove 
the right to review any decision of the QAA relating to s 28E(3) of the Act, 
regardless of when the decision was made. In the light of the decisions 
discussed in the previous section, it will be obvious how central s 28E(3) has 
been in fishers' challenges to determinations of the Director-General. The 
removal of the right to review such determinations on the ground of 
"commitment and dependence" deprives litigants of the fundamental basis for 
judicial review in this context. The Attorney-General was concerned that the 
proposed amendment was not a justified limitation of the right to apply for 
judicial review affirmed in s 27(2) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
The amendment as passed is open to the same criticism as the original, 
representing an infringement upon the right to judicial review which, although 
limited to impact upon only one subsection of the Act, will have a dramatic 
practical effect on the utility of judicial review in this area. 
Section 28ZGA(1 )(b)(ii) is a privative clause, attempting to oust the 
jurisdiction of the High Court to consider issues of law. The modern approach 
to such clauses in New Zealand relies heavily upon the intention of Parliament 
in enacting the particular provision .58 As Cooke P stated in the leading New 
Zealand case, Bulk Gas Users Group v Attorney-General, 59 an administrative 
tribunal can be empowered to conclusively determine questions of law. This 
empowerment must be clearly given, and there is a presumption against 
"
6 for example, ( 1992) 532 NZPD 12689, 12694, 13088. 
n Above n 42, 19. 
'
8 As compared with the earlier "jurisdictional" approach typified by the judgmcnt of Lord 
Reid in Anisminic Ltd v Foreiin Compensation Commission [ I 969 J 2 AC 147. 
w f 19831 NZLR 129. 
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Parliament derogating from the general courts' function of interpretin
g 
legislation.60 
That Parliamentary debates may be used as an aid to the interpretation 
of statutes in case of ambiguity is now well established .
61 In the present 
situation, the debates show that the provision as originally introduced was he
ld 
not to be a justified limit of the right in s 27(2) New Zealand Bill of Rights A
ct 
1990, in preventing judicial review without any time limitation. The provision wa
s 
amended, but without removing the mischief identified by the Attorney-Genera
l. 
Given the traditional reluctance of the courts to give effect to privative clauses,
62 
coupled with the weight to be given to s 27(2) New Zealand Bill of Rights A
ct 
1990, it may be arguable that s 28ZGA(1 )(b)(ii) should be read down to includ
e 
a time limitation as proposed by the Attorney-General.
63 As yet the subsection 
has not been interpreted by any court. If given effect to its full tenor it will, 
in 
practice, allow the QAA to make conclusive determinations in the vast majori
ty 
of cases. In any event, the effect of the amendment will be that determination
s 
will be more mechanical, with the factors of "commitment and dependence
" 
being supplementary rather than grounds for allocation in their own right. As w
ill 
be obvious from the previous section, these grounds provided the basis for th
e 
challenge of the QAA's determinations in virtually all cases. The amendme
nt 
has provided administrative certainty at the cost of individual fairness. 
Cooper was a test case in the truest sense of the phrase. As a striking 
out application involving clear statutory terms, the issues could have bee
n 
resolved shortly. However, Baragwanath J recognised the importance of th
e 
60 Above n 59, 136. Cooke P was strongly influenced by the approach of Lor
d Dip lock in Re 
Raced Communications [1981] AC 374 and O'Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 
AC 237. 
61 See J Burrows Statute Law in New Zealand (Butterworths, Wellington, 1992) 
136-140; 
Auckland City Council v Minister ofTransport [1990] 1 NZLR 264,293, 338
-339; Pepper v Hart 
[1993] AC 593. 
62 See Wade, above n 9, 729. 
63 The problem may lie in finding an ambiguity in the section, in order to just
ify the inclusion 
of the Parliamentary debates as an aid to interpretation. A counter argume
nt is that by ignoring 
the Attorney-General's advice, Parliament implicitly accepted that the New Z
ealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990 should be breached. 
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judgment as a means of explaining to the litigants how Parliament had 
exercised its sovereignty in removing their rights, and issued a fully reasoned 
judgment to this effect. 64 Judicial review provided an opportunity for the final 
definition of the respective rights and obligations of the parties. There is a clear 
analogy to be drawn between this decision and that in the cases involving the 
implementation of the Maori fisheries settlement:65 the real difficulties are 
factual, social, and political. The administrative law issues are separate, 
stemming from statutory interpretation, but must be seen in this wider context. 
IV THE CHALLENGE TO SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION 
While the Fisheries Act 1983 provides the framework for the regulation 
of the New Zealand fishing industry, much of the substance is provided by 
subordinate legislation. Over 30 sets of principal Regulations and Notices, and 
their amendments, govern matters such as the physical boundaries of QMAs, 
seasonal and other types of restrictions , reporting and record-keeping 
requirements, and other matters incidental to the industry. As such, they contain 
the most important restrictions upon fishers' daily activities, and are also of 
interest to others such as environmental pressure groups. Due to the 
prevalence of such regulations and their import for the industry, it is unsurprising 
that litigants have challenged their validity on a number of occasions. 
One of the fundamental roles of judicial review is as a tool to prevent 
the abuse or misuse of administrative power. As Wade states, "It is axiomatic 
that delegated legislation in no way partakes of the immunity which Acts of 
Parliament enjoy from challenge in the courts, for there is a fundamental 
difference between a sovereign and a subordinate law-making power."66 
Nevertheless, Parliament may legislate to make challenges to the substance of 
subordinate legislation very difficult. This is commonly achieved by granting 
64 Above n 42, 7. 
65 Below, Part VI. 
66 Wade, above n 9, 875. See also P PP P Craig Administrative Law (2 ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, 1989) 186-188. 
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stry 
extremely wide powers to make Regulations pursuant to the 
empowering Act, 
rather than by clauses attempting to oust the jurisdiction of 
the courts. 67 The 
Fisheries Act 1983 is no exception . Section 89 of the A
ct provides that 
regulations may be made for the purposes of "Generally reg
ulating fishing in 
New Zealand and New Zealand fisheries waters"
68
, and goes on to provide a 
list of specific subject areas which may be subject to regulatio
n.69 Regulations 
and Orders made under this provision have been challenge
d on substantive 
and procedural grounds, both by way of originating applicati
on and collateral 
challenge. The decisions are considered below. 
A Substantive Challenges 
The phrase "substantive challenges" is used herein to 
describe 
challenges to the content of regulations on administrative l
aw grounds. The 
plaintiffs in Sanford (South Island) v Mole & Others
70 sought a declaration that 
r 48 Fisheries (South East Area Commercial Fishing) R
egulations 1988 
Amendment No. 3 was made ultra vires the Fisheries Act 198
3. This amounted 
to a substantive challenge to the regulations in the sense 
that the plaintiffs 
argued that the substance of the disputed provision was outs
ide the powers to 
regulate conferred by the Act. The effect of the regulation wa
s to ban trawlers 
of over 23 metres in length from fishing in a certain area off 
Banks Peninsula 
for 2 ½ months per year. This measure, designed to protect 
salmon returning 
to spawn , prevented the plaintiffs targeting red cod and barra
cuda in the area 
at the height of the season. McGechan J noted the wide amb
it of the power to 
regulate contained in s 89, but held that this right must be re
conciled with the 
67 Wade, above n 9, 888. 
68 Section 89( I )(a). 
69 Section 89(l)(b)-89(1)(n). 
70 Sanford (South Island) v Moyle & Others Unreported, 10 Novem
ber 1989, High Court, 
Wellington Registry, CP 3/89. 
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requirements of the OMS and the rights conferred upon quota holders.71 The 
power to "regulate" contained in s 89 did not necessarily bestow the power to 
prohibit. 72 In particular, s 28B(5) expressed that no area could be removed from 
a OMA except by Act of Parliament. Although fishing permits issued under the 
Act were to be exercised in accordance with conditions and limits imposed (s 
28ZA(3)), McGechan J held that " ... regulations cannot be made under s 89 
which go so far as to render ineffective rights conferred under the OMS by ITO 
holders."73 However, the present regulation, limited as it was in time, area, and 
class of fishers affected , did not fall outside the right to regulate conferred bys 
89(1 )(a) . The decision in Sanford shows that the courts will be willing to impose 
restrictions upon regulations made under s 89 in some circumstances, but 
emphasises the difficulties a litigant will face in convincing a judge to do so. The 
question of what would need to be contained within regulations to render an 
applicant's ITO rights "ineffective" in terms of McGechan J's judgment remains 
open, but it is obvious that the threshold will be a high one. As recognised by 
Robertson J in Leigh Fishermans Association Inc v Minister of Fisheries74 , s 89 
is an "extraordinarily wide" provision , which will plainly authorise the vast 
majority of regulation in this area . A successful claim that Regulations were 
made ultra vires this section , it is submitted, will be immensely difficult to fulfil. 
Gallagher v Attomey-Genera/75 included a challenge to the substance 
of the Fisheries (Commercial Fishing) Regulations 1986, Amendment No 2. Ellis 
J heard argument on the issue of whether the content of the Regulations could 
be reviewed on the grounds of unreasonableness, although there was ample 
71 Above n 70, 7, 8. 
72 Above n 70, 6. 
73 Above n 70, 9 ( emphasis added). 
74 Leigh Fishermans Association Inc v Minister of Fisheries Unreported, 15 December 1995, 
High Court, Wellington Registry, CP 266/95 , 3. 
75 Gallagher v Attorney-General Unreported, 28 July 1988, High Court, Wellington Registry, 
CP 402/88 . 
26 Judicial Review and the New Zealand Fishing Indu
stry 
authority at the time against this proposition.
76 Although he found that the case 
before him was not an appropriate one for the Court to do
 so, he saw the 
possibility of the Court reviewing the substance of regulatio
ns on grounds of 
unreasonableness as "attractive in a general way" .
77 That regulations could be 
successfully challenged on the ground of unreasonableness 
was accepted by 
McGechan J in Turners & Growers Exports Ltd v Moyle, wher
e he stated that 
"In principle ... regulations can be challenged as ultra vires
 an empowering 
statute if the regulations are so unreasonable that their makin
g would not have 
been contemplated by parliament as empowered by that statu
te."78 McGechan 
J emphasised the extremely high threshold of unreasonablene
ss that would be 
required to invalidate regulations as ultra vires.
79 The unequivocal recognition 
of unreasonableness as a ground for the review of regulati
ons represents a 
significant advance from the earlier position in New Zealand, a
nd vindicates the 
stance taken in de Smith: that there is no basis in principle for 
precluding review 
on such grounds.80
 In the context of the fishing industry, unreasonableness of 
regulations was again argued in Leigh Fishermans Association 
Inc v Minister of 
Fisheries.81 Robertson J granted an interim order restraining 
the Crown from 
taking any actions for breach of the Regulations on the basis o
f what he saw as 
the main issue - breach of a duty of consultation . He left 
the questions of 
76 Eg Carrol v Attorney-General [1933] NZLR 1461; Kerridg
e v Curling Butcher [1933] 
NZLR 646; Cassens & Black v Prebble Unreported, 11 Aug
ust 1987, High Court, Wellington 
Registry, A 318/84, 5. Compare this with the English approac
h to Bylaws, which have long been 
reviewable on grounds of unreasonableness, eg Kruse v Jo
hnson [ 1898] 2 QB 91; Arlidge v 
Islington Corporation [1909] 2 KB 127. See P Walker "Irra
tionality and Proportionality" in M 
Supperstone and J Goudie (eds) Judicial Review (Butterworths, L
ondon, 1992) 119, 120, 132-
134. 
77 Above n 75 , 27. 
78 Turners & Growers Exports Ltd v Moyle Unreported, 15 Dece
mber 1988, High Court, 
Wellington Registry, CP 720/88, 49. 
79 Above n 78, 53-54, citing Cooke Pin Webster v Auckland Ha
rbour Board [1987] 2 NZLR 
129, 131-132. 
80 SA de Smith (J Evans, ed) Judicial Review of Administrative Ac
tion (4 ed, Stevens & Sons 
Ltd, London, 1980) 354-355. 
81 Leigh, above n 74, 2-5. 
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alleged unreasonableness, irrelevant considerations , and improper purposes 
open for resolution in a substantive hearing . 
B Procedural Grounds 
"Procedural grounds" is taken to mean errors in the administrative 
process leading up to the issue of Regulations, including breaches of any 
natural justice or legitimate expectation rights , and failure of the consultative 
process. The challenge to subordinate fisheries legislation on procedural 
grounds has been more successful than on substantive grounds such as 
unreasonableness. The nature of these challenges is such that the statements 
of claim often allege errors of both substance and procedure, leading to an 
overlap with the cases considered in the previous section . Applications for 
review of decisions made under, or subordinate legislation authorised by, the 
Fisheries Act 1983 have been at the leading edge of this aspect of 
administrative law in New Zealand over the last decade. 
1 Natural justice and common law consultation 
There is no general right to natural justice in respect of the making of 
subordinate legislation. Nevertheless, a duty to consult may be imposed upon 
a decision maker due to the past practice and conduct of that person , any 
promise of consultation made, and through the implicit meaning or express 
wording of a statute.82 As Taylor states, "The long standing practice of 
consulting interest groups in the development of subordinate legislation makes 
application of a legal duty to consult almost inevitable."83 Difficulties may arise 
concerning which interest groups should be granted the legal right to be 
consulted , and in considering whether consultation or adequate consultation 
actually took place . 
81 Taylor, above n 25, 13.59-1 3.6 1. See also Wade, above n 9, 897. 
83 Taylor, above n 25, 13.63. 
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In Fowler & Rodrique Ltd v Attomey-General, 84 the applicant fishing 
company sought a declaration that the Controlled Fisheries (Fouveaux Strait 
Dredge Oyster Fishery) Notice 1979 was invalid insofar as it fixed the maximum 
number of licences for that fishery at 23.85 The background to the proceedings 
was complex, revolving around the attempts of the applicants to procure a 
permit to dredge for oysters in an area ("H, K, & L") outside that defined as a 
special area by s 1 OA Fisheries Act 1908. This permit was eventually issued in 
March 1979, 4 years after the original application was made. On the same day 
all vessels licensed to fish in the special area had their permits extended to 
include areas H, K & L, while the applicant's vessel was limited to the latter 
area. In November 1979 s 1 OA was repealed, and both areas were declared to 
be a controlled area pursuant to the Regulation challenged . Licences for the 
fishery were limited to 23, with the Minister issuing a policy directive that only 
vessels currently authorised to fish in both areas should be issued the permits. 
The applicants brought review proceedings, based mainly upon an alleged 
breach of the requirements of natural justice, which were dismissed in the High 
Court by Cook J. The principal judgment in the Court of Appeal was delivered 
by Somers J, who outlined in detail the history of the legislation and the 
convoluted dealings between the applicants and the Ministry.86 His Honour 
emphasised that there was no general obligation upon the Minister to call for 
submissions when exercising his powers under the Act, but that circumstances 
may dictate an individual should be given the opportunity to be heard. He 
stated :87 
If the exercise of the power is likely to affect the interests of an individual in a way that 
is sign ificantly different from the way in which it is likely to affect the interests of the 
public generally, the person exercising the power will normally be expected to have 
regard to the rights of the ind ividual before it is exercised. Where a person having no 
84 [1 987] 2 NZLR 56. 
85 Above n 84, 59. 
86 Above n 84, 59-69. 
87 Above n 84, 74. 
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legal right to the renewal of the licence or permit has a reasonable and legitimate 
expectation of renewal the Court will normally intervene to protect that expectation by 
judicial review. 
The circumstances of the case were such that the applicants should have been 
afforded the natural justice rights to make submissions or to be heard in the 
process leading up to the issue of licences. 88 Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal 
exercised its discretion in refusing to make a declaration of invalidity. By the 
time of judgment the notice restricting the number of licences in the fishery had 
been revoked, and the Fisheries Act 1908 replaced by the 1983 Act, as 
amended in 1986. As Somers J stated, a declaration would "achieve nothing 
other than a peg upon which to hang costs."89 
Similar reasoning was applied in Gallagher v Attomey-Genera!,90 where 
Regulations changing the method of lobster measurement were promulgated. 
The plaintiff was a representative of southern fishers, who statistics showed 
would be more adversely affected by the changed system than other fishers 
throughout the country. Ellis J held that the group had a legitimate expectation 
that they would be consulted before the current, long-standing, system was 
changed. Looking at the situation on the whole, however, and with particular 
regard to the urgency of introducing the new system, the applicants were held 
to have been given sufficient opportunity to make submissions, and no remedy 
was granted. 91 
88 Above n 84, 74 (per Somers J), 78 (per Casey J). See S France "Legitimate Expectations in 
New Zealand" (1990) 14 NZULR 123 , 140. 
89 Above n 84, 74. 
90 Above n 75. 
91 Above n 75, 29. 
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The duty of consultation at common law
92 was also in issue in Leigh 
Fishermans Association lnc, 93 an application for an interim injunction under s 8 
Judicature Amendment Act 1972 restraining the Crown from instituting any 
proceedings for breaches of r 4(f)(1) Fisheries (Auckland and Kermadec Areas 
Commercial Fishing) Regulations 1986, as amended. The threshold issues of 
whether there was a duty to consult at all, and with this party, were established 
by the conduct of the Ministry. In that case the Ministry confirmed that it 
intended to consult with the applicant, but arguably did not carry out this 
process adequately. A prima facie case of such failure to consult adequately 
was held to be a sufficient ground to support the issue of an interim injunction.
94 
2 Statutory submissions or consultation 
The other source of a consultation requirement, howsoever limited, is 
the Fisheries Act 1983 itself. Various decisions made under the Act contain an 
express requirement for the making of submissions or consultation, which 
obviously becomes a mandatory consideration for the Minister in the decision-
making process. 95 Such a requirement is limited by the terms of the statute. 
New Zealand Fishing Industry Association v Ministry of Agriculture and 
Flsheries96 concerned the validity of the Fisheries (Resource Rentals Variation) 
Order 1987, which increased total resource rental payable by fishers. This 
variation had been authorised bys 107G, subsection 6 of which required the 
Minister to invite submissions from the applicant and others. Cooke P, adopting 
92 For discussion of the concept of consultation see Wellington International Airport Ltd v Air 
New Zealand [ 1993] 1 NZLR 671. 
93 Above n 74. 
94 Above n 74, 8-9. 
95 See the provisions listed in Southern Ocean Trmrlers Ltd v Director-General of Agriculture 
and Fisheries [1993] 2 NZLR 53 , 62. 
96 [1988] l NZLR 544 ("NZFIA"). This case is better known for the comments of Cooke P 
regarding mistake of fact as a ground of review; see T Jones "Mistake of Fact in Administrative 
Law" [1990] PL 507. 
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in part the judgment of McGechan J in the High Court, noted that the right to 
make submissions was narrower than that of consultation. The statutory duty 
to "have regard to" such submissions was satisfied by giving them genuine 
attention and thought. Due to the scheme of s 107G, and the originating policy 
content of the decision, this did not even require a completely open mind on the 
part of the Minister. This was qualified by the statement that "A considered 
predilection is not to become predetermination."97 
Greenpeace New Zealand Inc v Minister of Fisheries98 involved a 
challenge to the TACC set under s 280 of the Act. This contained a duty of 
consultation more in line with that at common law, requiring the Minister to 
consult with the Fishing Industry Board and such other interested parties as was 
seen fit before any recommendation or decision was made. However, the 
consultation in that case was seen to be genuine and the decision could not be 
impugned for failure in the consultative process. 99 
C Collateral Challenge 
As well as originating applications, the validity of Fisheries Regulations 
has been questioned by way of collateral challenge. The label "collateral 
challenge", according to Wade, "appl[ies] to proceedings which are not 
themselves designed to impeach the validity of some administrative act or 
order." 100 In MAF v CaldweYl,1 the defendant was charged with being in 
possession of Rock Lobsters that were carrying external eggs, in breach of cl 
13(a) Fisheries (Fish Species Restrictions) Notice 1983. The District Court 
Judge held that the charge was proved, but on the defendant's request deferred 
97 Above n 96, 551. 
98 Unreported, 27 November 1995, High Court, Wellington Registry, CP 492/93. 
99 Above n 98, 17. 
100 Wade, above n 9,321. 
10 1 Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries v Caldwell Unreported, 27 March 1988, High Court, 
Christchurch Registry M 505/85 . 
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entering the conviction and stated a case to the High Court questioning the 
validity of the Regulations. The notice was held to be intra vires s 89 Fisheries 
Act 1983, with Holland J stating that to hold otherwise would involve a very 
narrow or restricted interpretation of the provision.
102 Taking the same generous 
approach, and relying on ss 28(2) and 28(3) Evidence Act 1908, he held that 
certain irregularities in the publication of the notice did not affect its validity.
103 
Accordingly, the case stated affirmed the validity, and the matter was referred 
back to the District Court for the entry of a conviction. 
D Regulations under the Fisheries Act 1996 
The Fisheries Bill, as originally introduced, contained an empowering 
provision as wide and general as that in s 89(1 )(a) Fisheries Act 1983. The 
Regulations Review Committee was of the opinion that this regulation-making 
power was too broad, 104 and it was accordingly broken down into specifics.
105 
These specifics, when read together, provide such wide coverage of aspects of 
the fishing industry likely to be subject to regulation that it is hard to accept that 
the powers conferred are actually any narrower in substance. The move from 
general to specific drafting is unlikely to make applications for judicial review on 
the ground that the Minister was acting outside the ambit of the Act any more 
likely to succeed . 
The Act also contains a specific provision entitling regulations to be 
made prescribing transitional and saving provisions relating to its coming into 
force , which may be in addition to or in place of any of the current transitional 
provisions.106 This has the effect of allowing Regulations to amend, add to, or 
102 Above n 101 , 6. 
103 Above n 101 , 7-9. 
104 Report of the Primary Production Committee on the fisheries Bill , xxxvi . 
105 Section 297(1)(a) . Other specific regulation making powers are conferred by ss 297(1)(b)-
(y), 297(2), 298, 299, and 354. 
106 Section 354. This power expires on 30 September 2000, or sooner if provided by Order in 
Council. 
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repeal primary legislation. 107 Judicial review of such Regulations is available on 
the normal grounds. 
E Conclusion 
1 Substantive challenges 
The cases have shown that substantive challenges to Fisheries 
Regulations are possible, but are seriously restricted by the width of s 89, the 
empowering provision, and the consistently generous approach given to this by 
the courts. Unreasonableness has also been established as a ground of 
challenge, although this may be of more theoretical than practical benefit. 
These grounds overlap: it is unlikely that a regulation would be struck down as 
unreasonable if it was within the power conferred bys 89. 
2 Procedural challenges 
The common law duty of consultation appears to be a more efficacious 
means of challenging the validity of regulations than similar statutory obligations 
imposed under the Fisheries Act 1983. The duty of consultation may be 
imposed upon a decision maker due to the legitimate expectation of an 
individual arising because of special circumstances, such as in Fowler & 
Rodrique, 108 with the corresponding focus on the rights of the individual. While 
the distinction may be a fine one, a decision such as that made under s 107G 
in the NZFIA case, is more likely to fall within the realms of pure ministerial 
policy making . That section, in particular, allowed the Minister to develop a 
policy or strategy before the duty to call for submissions arose. Cooke P stated 
in that case: "As this case should demonstrate yet again, the courts recognise 
107 Above n I 04, xxxviii. This is an example of a "Henry VIII clause", which Wade sees as 
tolerable due to the intricacy of modern legislation. See Wade, above n 9, 863-865. 
108 Above n 84. 
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that they should not trespass into the legitimate policy making sphere of 
Ministers. "109 
Common law consultation arises in the process because of the effect 
a ministerial decision will have upon an individual,
110 while that imposed by 
statute arises by process, regardless of what the effect will be. Particularly at 
the interim stage, the courts have been concerned with the effect on the litigants 
of a decision. In considering an application for an injunction, the Court will be 
more likely to find that the balance of convenience favours the applicants if they 
can show actual negative effects that will flow from the decision under scrutiny. 
The discretionary nature of administrative law remedies has been an 
important influence in this area of the fishing industry. The courts have been 
more willing to find a breach of the applicants rights than to actually award a 
remedy. In acting thus, the courts have been influenced by essentially practical 
considerations. 111 
V OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE POWER: THE FORFEITURE REGIMES 
An important aspect of the Fisheries Act 1983 is its use of forfeiture 
provisions to penalise violations of the Act. These provisions vary in content 
depending upon the mischief they are aimed at preventing. On conviction of a 
quota management offence or an offence relating to returns and records, any 
property used in respect of the offending, fish or proceeds thereof received, and 
any quota held by the offender at the time of the offence, is forfeit to the Crown. 
The Court retains a discretion to order otherwise "for special reasons relating 
to the offence."112 For less major offences the regime is relaxed somewhat: for 
109 Above n 96, 554. 
11 0 This effect may have led to the original practice of consultation, which in tum may 
give rise 
to the duty, or may be sufficient in itself to raise "special circumstances". 
111 In Fowler & Rodrique, above n 84, for example, the law had subsequently changed to 
render any declaration or injunction meaningless. See Gallagher, above n 75, where a na
tural 
justice right was held to be outweighed by the urgency of the regulation. 
11
~ Section 107B(2). 
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unspecified offences punishable by a fine of over $5 OOO the Court has a 
discretion as to whether to order the forfeiture of quota, and where the 
maximum fine is under $5 OOO, quota is not forfeit. 113 On application, the 
Minister may order the release of forfeited property to those interested, and may 
order payment for release of up to the property's market value.114 Forfeiture is 
also the result of the breach of the foreign control and anti-aggregation 
provisions of the Act. This may be remedied, on the Minister's discretion, by an 
order under s 28U . This section examines the availability of judicial review as 
a means of challenging forfeiture under the Fisheries Act. 
A General Breaches of the Act 
Conviction for a quota management offence or a returns and records 
offence leads to forfeiture of quota, fish and proceeds thereof, and property 
used in committing the offence. This occurs by automatic operation of law; it 
does not involve the exercise of any form of decision-making power, and is not 
subject to judicial review. More interesting is the issue of the court's discretion 
to waive forfeiture "for special reasons relating to the offence."115 The refusal of 
a District Court Judge to exercise this discretion has been held not to be subject 
to appeal, as it does not involve the court in making an "order". 116 As Taylor 
states, judicial review will not often be entertained in respect of decisions of 
inferior courts. It is a matter for the discretion of the superior court, and may be 
considered more appropriate if third party rights are at stake.117 Third party 
113 In both cases fish and proceeds remain forfeit, along with property in some circumstances: 
Sees 107C(3), (4). 
114 Section 107C(2). 
115 For the meaning imputed to this phrase, contained ins 107B, see MAF v Schofield [1990] 
1 NZLR 210. 
116 Hare v Minist1y of Agriculture and Fisheries Unreported, 17 December 1991, High Court, 
Wellington Registry, AP 12/91, 10. See M Briggs "Mistake of Law and Mitigation: Forfeiture 
under the Fisheries Act 1983" [ 1996] NZLJ 145. 
117 Taylor, above n 25, 1.27. 
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rights may be at stake in cases such as those presently under consideration, 
although it has been held that the rights of innocent part owners of forfeited 
property cannot be considered as "special reasons" under s 1078(2).
118 The 
lack of an appeal right alone may be seen as justifying the High Court in hearing 
a judicial review application under this section, but such an application does not 
appear to have been made thus far. 
The question of whether such a decision is reviewable becomes less 
of a concern when the alternative procedure for the recovery of forfeited assets 
is considered. Under s 107C(2) any party having a legal or equitable interest in 
forfeited property may apply to the Minister for its release. With regard to 
forfeited property, with the exception of quota, the Minister's discretion to 
release it is not fettered by the statute. Section 107C(3) sets out a list of 
mandatory considerations to be given regard by the Minister in deciding whether 
to release forfeited quota. In performing this function, the Minister is 
undoubtedly exercising a statutory power of decision, reviewable under the 
Judicature Amendment Act 1972. In Roach v Kidd, the applicants had been 
convicted of offences against the Fisheries Act, had forfeited property and 
quota, and had applied to the Minister for their return.
119 The Minister refused 
to return either, and his decision not to exercise his power to do so was 
challenged by the applicants. 120 The grounds for review claimed were that the 
Minister had acted unreasonably and on errors of law and fact in coming to his 
decision. 121 
A preliminary point was the Minister's use of the matters set out in s 
107C(3). These were mandatory considerations in relation to quota, and he 
expressed that they were used as a "useful checklist" in relation to the other 
property forfeited . Without deciding, McGechan J was of the opinion that 
considerations in respect of other property, upon which the statute was silent, 
118 Basile v Atwill [1995] 2 NZLR 537, 539. Third party rights can be considered under s 
107C(2). 
119 Unreported, 12 October 92, High Court, Wellington Registry, CP 715/91. 
120 The Minister set out his grounds for refusal in full: see above n 119, 9-11. 
121 Above n 119, 13. 
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would be wider than these specifics.122 This seems a sensible approach from 
an administrative law standpoint; failure to consider wider relevant factors than 
those expressed in the subsection may lead to review on grounds of error of 
law. 
McGechan J accepted that mistake of fact was available as a ground 
for review in situations such as the present, quoting Cooke P in NZFIA, 123 where 
he stated " ... the failure to consider statutory criteria extends to facts so plainly 
relevant to those criteria that Parliament would have intended them to have 
been taken into account and a reasonable Minister would not fail to do so."124 
However, the applicants argument, that the Minister acted under a mistake of 
fact in treating Rig as a "stressed species" in coming to his conclusion, failed to 
convince McGechan J. The main error of law alleged was that the reference to 
"previous offending history" in s 107C(3) related only to previous convictions , 
and that the Minister had interpreted this wrongly. It was held that the phrase 
included convictions, but also offences which could be clearly established to 
have occurred, while not having lead to conviction .125 Accordingly, this ground 
of review also failed. 
Section 107C(3) states that the Minister may give such weight as he 
sees fit to the matters set out therein. One of the factors to be considered is the 
"social and economic effects on the person who held the quota."126 In the 
present case the Minister evaluated these consequences for the applicants as 
"drastic", but then stated that "those impacts should have been foreseen" and 
gave the consequences little or no weight in coming to his decision. 127 It was 
held that the failure to give the factors more than minimal weight was an 
approach not open at law, and rendered the decision unreasonable. 
122 Above n 119, 11. 
123 Above n 96, 552. 
124 Above n 119, 17. 
125 Above n 119, 24, 26-27. 
126 Section 107C(3)(g). 
127 Above n 119, 31. 
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In coming to this decision , McGechan J read in the requirement that the 
weight given to these factors must be "within the limits of reason."
128 This 
phrase, in this context, originates from Cooke P in NZFIA , 
129 where the statute 
was silent on the question of the weight to be given to the factors set out in 
s107G(7) (a)-(e) . An attack on the weight attached by a decision maker to a 
relevant consideration is a somewhat controversial ground of review.
130 
McGechan J's approach in the present case would , practically, include 
insufficient weight as a factor leading to unreasonableness rather than as a 
ground of review in its own right. Taylor criticises this type of approach , 
preferring to keep weight as a discrete ground of review, applying the narrower 
test of "effectively no weight" being placed on the relevant consideration .
131 
B Breaches of the Foreign Control Restrictions 
Forfeiture by automatic operation of law also occurs where a quota 
holder breaches the foreign control restrictions contained in the Act. This takes 
place when a quota holder becomes subject to greater than 25% control from 
a person or body corporate not ordinarily resident in New Zealand , and fails to 
dispose of the quota within 3 months of this occurring.
132 The Director-General 
may permit the acquisition or continued holding of quota by persons otherwise 
prohibited , and also retains a broad discretion to transfer quota to any person 
that he/she sees fit. 
Southern Ocean Trawlers Ltd v Director-General of Agriculture and 
Fisheries133 arose from changes in the share holding in Carter Holt Harvey, 
owners of the Sealord group of companies, which took the fisheries companies 
128 Above n 119, 3 1. 
129 Above n 105, 31. 
130 Taylor, above n 25 , 14.3 1. 
131 Above n 130. 
132 Section 28Z( 1 ), (2) , (3 ), (8), ( 11 ). 
133 [1993] 2 NZLR 53 . 
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over the proscribed foreign holding threshold. This came to the attention of the 
Director-General more than 3 months after the changes had taken place, and 
he entered into a deed with Sealords purporting to grant them permission to 
continue to hold quota pursuant to s 28Z(9) or, alternatively, if the quota was 
held to have been forfeited, retransferring it under s 28U. 134 These decisions of 
the Director-General were challenged by the applicants. It was held that 
forfeiture was automatic upon the expiry of the 3 month period, and that this 
could not be remedied by a retrospective extension of time. However, the 
Director-General had evidently been advised of this possibility, and the 
alternative retransfer of quota under s 28U was effective. 135 Although effective 
in law, this decision was further challenged on the grounds that it was made 
under a mistake of fact, that there was a legitimate expectation of consultation, 
and that it was unreasonable in acting contrary to the purposes and spirit of the 
Act. None of these grounds were accepted by the court, in a decision notable 
as a further example of judicial restraint from interfering with executive policy 
making. 136 As Cooke P noted, "National economic considerations being 
involved, it is obvious that no Court would find such a decision unreasonable 
except on very strong grounds. "137 
The same provision was in issue in Director-General of Agriculture and 
Fisheries v Saragossa Holdings Ltd, 138 although in a different context. The 
respondents had sold quota to Australians, masked by the use of a company 
issuing "unit licences" to complete the transactions, and were held in the District 
Court to have breached s 28Z Fisheries Act. The judge did not enter convictions 
immediately, on the grounds that there may be alternative options for resolution, 
prompted by the fact that forfeiture under s 1078(2) would automatically follow 
conviction. Before the judge could make further orders, the respondents were 
134 Above n 133, 57. 
135 Above n 133, 60-61 . 
136 Another example in this area is the NZFIA case, above n 96. 
137 Above n 133, 62. 
138 Unreported, 9 December 1994, Court of Appeal , CA 4/94. 
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informed that their quota had been forfeited under s 28Z(11 ). Following this, the 
respondents were discharged without conviction under s 19 Criminal Justice Act 
1985.139 The respondents sought relief from this forfeiture by way of judicial 
review, upon which application Ellis J granted an interim order that the quota be 
deemed registered in the name of the respondents pending the resolution of 
substantive proceedings.140 The Crown appealed . 
The Court of Appeal distinguished between the actual forfeiture of quota 
and the Director-General's duty to record transfers in the register established 
bys 28P. It was held that the duty to record the transfer may not be a "statutory 
power of decision" as defined ins 3 Judicature Amendment Act 1972, but was 
at least a statutory power within the meaning of s 4(1) of that Act. The exercise 
of the power to alter the register was therefore reviewable, and the High Court 
did have jurisdiction to provide interim relief. Further, it was held that "The 
registration is inseverable from the underlying quota, and to be effective the 
interim injunction must extend to the later also."
141 The court's reasoning was 
further buttressed by its reference to s 27(2) New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990: the Director-General's action under s 28P was seen as a "determination" 
as referred to in that subsection , on the generous construction to be given to 
that statute. 142 
On the merits, the injunction was to be maintained. In the Court's view, 
the decisive factor was the Ministry's procedure in pursuing the claim. The 
Ministry had elected to prosecute the applicants under a quota management 
offence, rather than rely upon automatic forfeiture . It was stated by the court 
that "If the Ministry does elect the course of a prosecution , we think that to 
make the Act work as Parliament must have intended the question of forfeiture 
must be treated as submitted to the Court."
143 The forfeiture regimes under 
139 Above n 138, 3-9. 
140 Above n 138, 2. 
141 Above n 138, 12. 
142 Above n 138, 12. 
143 Above n 138, 16. 
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these provisions were different: the effect of s 28Z could be ameliorated by a 
decision of the Director-General under that section , while the court had similar 
powers under s 1078. It was held that the scheme of the legislation was such 
that the more general s 1078(2) took precedence overs 28Z in the case of any 
conflict. 
C Forfeiture under the Fisheries Act 1996 
The general forfeiture provisions under the 1996 Act are similar to those 
currently in place, linking the level of forfeiture with the seriousness of the 
offence. Section 255 operates in the same manner as s 1078(2) of the 1983 
Act; forfeiture follows conviction by operation of law, unless the court sees fit to 
order otherwise for special reasons relating to the offence. A person whose 
property is forfeit may apply to the High Court, rather than the Minister, for its 
release. The court is bound to take a list of factors into account, similar to that 
in 107C(3), in relation to both quota and property. This avoids the uncertainty 
as to the extent of mandatory considerations that occurred in Roach, 144 although 
the transfer of the decision-making power from the Minister to the court 
removes the determination from the ambit of judicial review in any event. 
The forfeiture regime for breaches of the foreign holding provisions 
have been made more certain under the new Act. If the Chief Executive 
believes on reasonable grounds that the provision has been breached , he may 
direct that a caveat be lodged against the alleged offender's quota in the 
register established by Part VIII of the Act. 145 Upon notification , the owner has 
a specified period of not less than 60 days to apply to the High Court for a 
declaration that they are not an overseas person within the meaning of the Act. 
If such application is not made within the limitation period , the interest to which 
the notice referred is forfeited by operation of law. Where the court declares the 
person to be an overseas person, and finds that they had actual or constructive 
knowledge of this and failed to apply for permission to continue to hold quota, 
144 Above n 119. 
145 This, and the fo llowing observations, are taken from s 58. 
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an order of forfeiture without compensation will be made. In any other case, the 
court has a discretion whether to order forfeiture or whether to order the 
overseas person to dispose of their interest. The practical effect of this is that 
the Ministry has no need to prove a breach of the provision ; the onus, and 
expense, of obtaining a declaration is upon the quota holder. Failure to apply 
for a declaration leads to automatic forfeiture, without the need for the Ministry 
to take any formal legal steps. The uncertainty that led to the litigation 
discussed in Part VB, above, has been removed . However, judicial review may 
still have a part to play in this area. The Minister's decision to order the issue of 
a caveat is a statutory one, to be exercised on reasonable grounds, and may 
be subject to review on the same reasoning as that applied in Saragossa.
146 
D Conclusion 
The effectiveness of judicial review as a means for challenging forfeiture 
is restricted by the nature of the forfeiture itself, occurring as it does by 
operation of law. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal in Saragossa showed its 
creativity, finding itself able to get around this problem by allowing review of the 
attached duty to record transfers. This sends a clear signal to the Ministry that 
the use of forfeiture provisions contained in the 1983 Act will be subject to 
judicial scrutiny, regardless of the apparent form of the statute. As has been 
seen , different forfeiture provisions contain different means for ameliorating the 
harshness of the penalty: the discretion of either the court or the Minister. The 
Minister's decision is undoubtedly subject to review, while the court's is 
potentially so. 
There has been only limited litigation in this area . A trend that has 
emerged is that the forfeiture cases to reach the courts have been, to some 
extent, test cases. 147 These judicial review cases have served to define the 
duties of the Minister, which offers invaluable guidance for future decisions 
made under similar provisions. It could be argued that the courts have taken a 
146 Text accompanying above n 138. 
w See Southern Ocean Fisheries Ltd, above n 133, 56; Roach v Kidd, above n 119, 35. 
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more proactive role than is usual in this area of the industry. Roach v Kidd and 
Saragossa give a strong indication of the court's willingness to intervene in this 
area, and that Ministerial decisions will be carefully scrutinised . The decision in 
Saragossa borders on interfering with Ministerial policy: the practice of issuing 
informations against an offender, and relying upon a finding of guilt to justify the 
application of the specific forfeiture provision in s 28Z, was not accepted. 
However, wider policy directions of the Ministry, such as in Southern Ocean 
Trawlers Ltd, were deferred to. It may be that these decisions have resulted in 
a higher standard of Ministerial decision making, which would explain the 
relative dearth of challenges. 
VI MAORI AND COMMERCIAL FISHING IN NEW ZEALAND 
A Introduction 
An examination of the role of judicial review within the New Zealand 
fishing industry would not be complete without consideration of the issues which 
have arisen for Maori. The area of fisheries has always been a vital one for 
Maori, with voluble complaints over legislative interference with their traditional 
rights continuing since at least 1879.148 A presumption made in New Zealand's 
earliest fisheries Act149 continued in legislation for over a century: "that Maori 
fishing has no commercial component and grounds reserved must be for 
personal needs."150 This came to an end with the enactment of the Maori 
Fisheries Act in 1989, and subsequently with the landmark Sealord deal 
between the Crown and Maori in 1992. 
This section of the paper outlines the provisions of the deal in its 
context as a disposition of a significant proportion of the available commercial 
fishing rights in New Zealand, and considers the continuing problems in its 
148 Report of the Waitangi Tribunal on the Muriwhenua Fishing Claim (Wai 22, Waitangi 
Tribunal, Department of Justice, Wellington 1988) 222 ('Muriwhenua Report'). 
149 Fish Protection Act 1877. 
150 Muriwhenua Report, above n 148, 222. 
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implementation from an administrative law perspective. The issue of the 
interface between the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi and Acts of the New 
Zealand Parliament is one of the most important to ever arise before the courts 
of this country, but is severable from the administrative law problems which 
arise. 151 The Treaty issues arising from the Sealord deal are not considered 
here; although they are of fundamental importance, the questions are more 
constitutional than administrative, and are outside the scope of this paper. The 
earlier issues of Maori grievances under the Treaty of Waitangi and the 
convoluted processes that culminated in the Sealord deal are well covered 
elsewhere.152 Further Treaty issues have arisen in the recent cases considered 
below, but are not focused on here. These involve the question of the meaning 
of "iwi", including the issue of the entitlement of urban Maori , 
153 and whether 
special consideration should be given to the claims of Chatham Island Maori 
and Moriori .154 What is focused on is the role of judicial review in defining the 
jurisdictions of the various bodies interested in administering the fisheries 
Settlement. 
B The Seaford Deal 
The Maori Fisheries Act 1989 established the Maori Fisheries 
Commission, later renamed as the Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission 
151 See the landmark case of New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR 
641. 
152 For comprehensive coverage of these issues see P McHugh "Sealords and Sharks: The 
Maori Fisheries Agreement 1992" [1992] NZLJ 354; A Waetford "Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries 
Claim) Settlement Act 1992" (1993) 7 Auck U L R; M Robinson "The Sealord Fishing 
Settlement: An International Perspective" (1994) 7 Auck UL R 557; (especially) J Munro "The 
Treaty of Waitangi and the Sealord Deal" (1994) 24 VUWLR 389. See also Te Runanga 0 
Wharekauri Rekohu Inc v Attorney-General [1993] 2 NZLR 301. 
153 See Hauraki Maori Trust Board v Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission 12 February 
1996, High Court, Auckland Registry, CP 562/94, noted in [1996] Maori L R (Feb) 4; Te 
Runanga O Muriwhenua v Te Runanganui O Te Ika Assoc Inc Unreported, 30 April 1996, Court 
of Appeal, CA 155/95, 165/95, 184/95, 25-29. 
154 Te Runanga O Muriwhenua, above n 153, 20-21. 
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("the Commission") .155 The Commission was transferred, in instalments, 1 O 
percent of existing quota under the QMS, along with $10 OOO 000.156 This was 
to be applied in pursuance of the functions set out in s 5 of the Act, with the 
general purpose of furthering the development of Maori commercial fishing 
interests. The Maori Fisheries Act 1989 offered only a temporary solution.157 
The opportunity for final settlement of the fisheries grievances of Maori arose 
when Sealord Fisheries Ltd, the major player in the New Zealand fishing 
industry, was put on the market in 1992.158 After intense negotiations, the Crown 
and representatives of Maori entered into a Deed of Settlement. 159 This involved 
the Crown purchasing a half share of Sealords on behalf of Maori , and 
undertaking to allocate 20 percent of any new quota to Maori. These assets 
were to be held by the Commission. In return , specified civil proceedings were 
to be discontinued, 160 and the jurisdiction of the Waitangi Tribunal to hear claims 
relating to commercial fishing was removed .161 This deal was legislatively 
confirmed by the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claim) Settlement Act 1992 ("the 
Settlement Act") . 
The effect of the Settlement is that about 36 percent of current quota, 
and at least 20 percent of all new quota issued , is held by Maori interests.162 
This entitlement is divided into the assets transferred under the Maori Fisheries 
155 Section 4 Maori Fisheries Act 1989, as amended by s 14 Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries 
Claim) Settlement Act 1992. 
156 Maori Fisheries Act 1989 ss 40, 45. 
157 Munro, above n 152, 407. 
158 This sale was due to Carter Holt Harvey, the parent company, infringing the foreign control 
restrictions contained in s 28Z Fisheries Act 1983. See above, Part V. 
159 The Deed is set out in Te Runanga O Wharekauri Rekohu Inc, above n l 52, 3 11 -32 1. 
160 Those specifically listed in s 11 Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claim) Settlement Act 1992. 
161 Section 40. See Fisheries Selllement Report (Waitangi Tribunal Report No 307, 
Wellington, 1992) 9-10 for a criticism of the Deed's effect on claims under the Treaty of 
Waitangi. 
162 Hauraki Maori Trust Board v Waitangi Tribunal Unreported, 31 July 1995, High Court, 
Wellington Registry, CP 171/95, CP 154/95, 12. 
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Act 1989, and those conferred under the Sealord deal. The later deal in 
particular was controversial, although the chances of a transaction which acted 
as full and final settlement of all Treaty fisheries claims being met with 
consensus agreement were minimal. Dissenting lwi sought relief from the 
enactment of the Settlement Act finalising the deal. It was held by Cooke P, 
delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal, that there was an "established 
principle of non-interference by the Courts in Parliamentary proceedings", 163 and 
that accordingly the courts should refrain from prohibiting a Minister from 
introducing a Bill into Parliament. For the appellants, the proper time for 
challenging an Act, through any relevant limitations, was after the enactment. 164 
As noted above, the Act was passed in December 1992. 
C Problems of Allocation. 
The Commission has, as one of its statutory functions, the responsibility to 
develop a procedure for identifying beneficiaries under the Settlement Act and 
a procedure for allocating the benefits bestowed by the Settlement to such 
beneficiaries. 165 This is to be achieved in the form of a new Maori Fisheries Act. 
The model to be used for the allocation of these resources is of fundamental 
importance to the potential beneficiaries. The proposed mana whenua, mana 
moana system ("authority over the land carries authority over the sea") is a 
substantial reason for the split between Maori interest groups. This method of 
allocation would give coastal lwi all Maori quota for inshore fishing, and 50 
percent of the corresponding deepwater areas. It is contended that it would 
unfairly disadvantage inland lwi such as Muriwhenua, while providing an unfair 
advantage for lwi with authority over a long stretch of coastline, such as Ngai 
Tahu. 166 In light of this type of concern several groups of Maori commenced 
163 Te Runanga O Wharekauri Rekohu Inc, above n 152, 307. 
164 Te Runanga O Wharekauri Rckohu Inc, above n 152, 308. 
165 Section 6(e) Maori Fisheries Act 1989, as amended bys 15 of the Settlement Act. 
166 See above n 142, 33-34. In Te Runanga O Muriwhenua v Te Runanganui O Te Ika Assoc 
Inc , above n 153, it was stated that the mana whenua, mana moana model would give 
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proceedings before the Waitangi Tribunal asking it to define how the 
Commission was to proceed in accordance with the principles of the Treaty. In 
a contested hearing, the Tribunal held that it had the jurisdiction to make such 
recommendations, and set down a date for the hearing of the substantive 
proceedings. 167 
The Waitangi Tribunal was established by the provisions of the Treaty 
of Waitangi Act 1975. Its jurisdiction to consider claims is conferred by s 6, to 
which s 6(7) was added by the Settlement Act: 
(7) Notwithstanding anything in this Act or any other Act or rule of law, on and from the 
commencement of this subsection the Tribunal shall not have jurisdiction to inquire or further 
inquire into, or to make any finding of recommendation in respect of, --
(a) Commercial fishing or commercial fisheries (within the meaning of the Fisheries Act 
1983); or 
(b) The Deed of Settlement between the Crown and Maori dated the 23rd day of 
September 1992; or 
(C) Any enactment to the extent that it relates to such commercial fishing or 
commercial fisheries. 
Section 9(b)-(c) of the Settlement Act provides: 
(b) The obligations of the Crown to Maori in respect of commercial fishing are hereby fulfilled , 
satisfied, and discharged; and no court or tribunal shall have jurisdiction to inquire into the validity 
of such claims, the existence of rights or interests of Maori in commercial fishing, or the 
quantification thereof, the validity of the Deed of Settlement referred to in the Preamble to this 
Act, or the adequacy of the benefits to Maori referred to in paragraph (a) of this section; and 
© All claims (current and future) in respect of, or directly or indirectly based on , rights and 
interests of Maori in commercial fishing are hereby fully and finally settled, satisfied, and 
discharged . 
Muriwhenua an average of $203.92 per person, as compared with $4533.24 for Ngai Tahu. 
167 Waitangi Tribunal Report 447, as cited in Te Runanga O Muriwhenua, above n 153, 22-23. 
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In holding that the Tribunal would have the jurisdiction to entertain the 
applicant's claims, as far as they related to a policy or practice of the Crown, 168 
Ellis J relied heavily on the context of the legislation . He stated: 169 
In my view the principles of the Treaty and the resolve by the Crown and Maori to settle 
fishing claims once and for all in a spirit of cooperation and good faith must guide the 
interpretation of the 1992 Act and the amendments made to other Acts affected .... [It] 
is for this reason that I prefer [counsel for the third defendants] submissions rather 
than the more straightforward approach of the plaintiffs. 
He saw s 6(7) as preventing any challenge to the Settlement itself, but 
not precluding an interpretation of the rights and obligations under the Treaty 
applicable by those administering the Settlement. 170 Such an extreme gloss on 
the natural meaning of the subsection was seen as justified on the exceptional 
contextual grounds. Although s 6(7) is not, strictly speaking, an ouster clause, 
the approach taken by Ellis J in the present case represented a greater move 
away from Parliament's express intention than that exemplified in cases 
considering such clauses.171 However, it was held that in the present situation 
the applicants' claim to the Tribunal was premature. The "policy" which the 
Waitangi Tribunal would have jurisdiction to consider would exist at the end of 
the Commission's deliberations, upon its report to the Minister, but not before. 
The Tribunal was therefore barred from inquiring into the Commission's 
processes, and the claim was prevented from continuing .172 
The applicants in the High Court appealed to the Court of Appeal. The 
Court, the judgment of which was delivered by Lord Cooke of Thorndon, 
differed from the decision of Ellis J. The Court also focused on the Deed and 
the other relevant background to the legislation , but held that as part of the 
168 In terms of s 6(1)(c) Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975. 
169 Above n I 62, 36. 
170 Above n I 62, 37. 
171 Eg Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147. 
172 Above n 162, 37, 48. 
\ 
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Settlement between the Crown and Maori, it had been agreed that the Tribunal 
would have no further jurisdiction over commercial fishing matters. 173 Section 
6(7) accurately reflected this: 174 
There is no need for the Court to be astute to avoid placing on s 6(7) its natural and 
ordinary meaning. In legal terms it is to be seen more realistically as a demarcation 
clause than as a privative one. Parliament was establishing what is essentially another 
body to safeguard Maori interests. The intention reasonably to be inferred is that in the 
special field the more general Tribunal was no longer to operate by way of considering 
claims under s 6 of the Treaty of Waitangi Act. 
The court also drew a distinction between s 6(7) and s 9(b) of the 
Settlement Act. Section 9(b) was a "true privative clause", and although it 
overlapped the subject matter of s 6(7) , its effect on High Court proceedings 
would fall to be interpreted in accordance with Anisminic principles. 175 It was 
accepted that the Commission was subject to judicial review of its 
determinations, and the court appeared to assume that s 9(b) would not 
preclude review of such a determination.176 It also follows that s 9(b) would not 
prevent review of any consideration by the Tribunal of any Bill referred to it 
under s 8 Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975. 
The Court of Appeal has subsequently granted leave to appeal to the 
Privy Council ; it is likely that the case will be heard in January 1997.177 It is 
argued that this appeal is unlikely to succeed, at least in regard to the 
jurisdictional issues that have been considered herein. Both the High Court and 
the Court of Appeal considered the legislation with particular reference to its 
contextual background, as was their duty. The Court of Appeal felt that it was 
173 Te Runanga O Muriwhenua, above n 153, 22; Fisheries Settlement Report, WTR 307, 
above n 161 , 1. 
174Te Runanaga O Muriwhenua, above n 153, 23. 
175 Te Runanga O Muriwhenua, above n 153, 24. 
176 Te Runanga O Muriwhenua, above n 153, 25. 
177 Te Runanga O Muriwhenua & Ors v Te Runanganui O Te Upuko O Te lka Assoc Inc & Ors 
Unreported, 26 June 1996, Court of Appeal, CA 155/95, 165/95 , 184/95 , 7. 
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able to give the relevant phrases their natural meaning without relying upon 
context to twist the legislature's intention as Ellis J had done in the High Court. 
The natural meaning of the phrases considered was not inconsistent with the 
Settlement between the Crown and Maori . As stated in the Court of Appeal , 
"Complex though the underlying problem assuredly is, the issues ... are broad 
and we can determine them by quite broad and simple reasoning." 178 This 
approach seems preferable, in recognising the demarcation between strictly 
legal questions and those with broader implications. 
D Maori and the Fisheries Act 1996 
The 1996 Act provides for the Commission to be allocated 20% of all 
new quota issued, as was contemplated by the Deed of Settlement. Section 5 
provides that the Act is to be interpreted, and powers under the Act are to be 
exercised consistently with , New Zealand's international obligations and the 
provisions of the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claim) Settlement Act 1992. 
Section 9 of the 1992 Act expresses that the agreement reached is a full and 
final settlement of all Maori claims in respect of commercial fishing, howsoever 
founded . Decisions under the 1996 Act will not necessarily require any further 
reference to Maori interests other than those expressly required .179 However, s 
10 of the 1992 Act preserves Treaty obligations relating to non-commercial 
Maori fishery rights and interests, which will be read as incorporated into the 
1996 Act for decisions relating to such matters.180 
E Conclusion 
The area of Maori commercial fishing rights is of the utmost national 
importance, both economically and constitutionally. As will be apparent from the 
preceding discussion, and as recognised by the Court of Appeal, the actual 
178 Te Runanga O Muriwhenua, above n 153 , 15. 
179 For example, consultation with Maori on sustainability issues is required bys 12. 
180 See also Part IX of the Act for coverage of Maori customary fishing rights. 
Judicial Review and the New Zealand Fishing Industry 51 
administrative law questions raised are subordinate to the problems inherent in 
the subject matter, while the constitutional matters at stake provide a unique 
challenge for our courts. The difficulties in this area are more political: the 
difficulties of attempting to implement the Settlement provisions while alienating 
as few groups as possible. Judicial review has played a significant role in this 
area, in providing a means for the litigants to air their grievances in the superior 
courts. This may be seen as an important aspect of the process as a whole. On 
a more practical level, judicial review has been effective as a means of defining 
the roles of the bodies involved, the Tribunal and the Commission . This 
provides a framework by which, following the exhaustion of appeal rights , the 
Settlement will finally be concluded. 
VII CONCLUSION 
The role of judicial review in each of the specific areas considered has 
been summarised in the conclusions at the end of each section, and will not be 
repeated here in full. This conclusion seeks to evaluate the impact of judicial 
review on the fishing industry as a whole, in the light of the comments of Lord 
Woolf set out above. 181 In the same lecture, Lord Woolf noted that "Until 
recently, the area of commerce, finance, and industry would not have been 
regarded as obvious fields for the use of the public law remedy of judicial 
review." 182 Within the New Zealand fishing industry, it has been in areas where 
an administrative decision directly impacts upon an individual's commercial 
interests that the High Court has shown itself most likely to intervene.183 This 
focus upon the interests of individual entities rather than wider groups was a 
theme that emerged particularly clearly in the context of challenges to statutory 
181 Above, text accompanying n 2. 
182 Above n 2, 2. 
183 For example the cases decided relating to quota allocation, above Part II , and those 
involving forfeiture of quota, above Part V. 
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Regulations. 184 This distinction fits in with the unwillingness of the courts to 
intervene within the "legitimate policy making sphere of Ministers"; 185 broader 
decisions, affecting a wider range of groups within the industry, are more likely 
to fall within this inviolable sphere. 186 
udicial review has also provided a mechanism by which interested 
parties could achieve definition of their contested rights and obligations, 
therefore informing future decision maki~Cooperwas a test case, as were 
Saragossa, Roach, and the cases concern:ng the implementation of the Treaty 
of Waitangi (Fisheries Claim) Settlement Act 1992. Apart from where decisions 
provide mandatory orders, it is impossible to quantify exactly what effect 
successful judicial review applications have on future Ministerial or departmental 
decisions; this is where judicial review acts as a "non-nuclear deterrent". It is 
certain, however, that the legislature pays close attention to the effect of judicial 
intervention within the industry. The enactment of s 28ZGA Fisheries Act 1983, 
in express and direct response to the Court of Appeal's decision in Jenssen, is 
an example of this. The Fisheries Act 1996 also contains measures which could 
be seen as reactions to judicial decisions: the regulation of the QMS is further 
tightened, while changes to the forfeiture regimes remove the uncertainties that 
gave rise to litigation in that area . 
These legislative changes will serve to reduce the scope for judicial 
review of administrative action within the fishing industry. Review under the 
1996 Act is likely to be much less commonplace than when the QMS was 
introduced in 1986. This is not necessarily a bad thing. Judicial review has 
served its purpose of defining rights and obligations, and informing decision 
making. This has prompted the legislature to intervene in areas which judicial 
review applications had shown were ill-defined or administratively inefficient. 
Administrative efficiency in an industry as highly regulated as that under 
18
~ Compare, for example, Fowler & Rodrique, above n 84, with Greenpeace (NZ) Inc , above 
n 98, and NZFIA, above n 96. 
185 NZFIA, above n 96, 554. 
186 Compare this with the use of prosecution to justify automatic forfeiture in Saragossa, above 
n 138, which was not seen as legitimate Ministerial policy. 
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consideration can only be beneficial to all parties. It is fair to say that in this 
segment of the commercial arena, judicial review has done its job well, and will 
continue to do so in the future if needed. 
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